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Evidence from social psychology suggests that agents process information about their own ability
in a biased manner. This evidence has motivated exciting research in behavioral economics, but has
also garnered critics who point out that it is potentially consistent with standard Bayesian updating.
We implement a direct experimental test. We study a large sample of 656 undergraduate students,
tracking the evolution of their beliefs about their own relative performance on an IQ test as they receive
noisy feedback from a known data-generating process. Our design lets us repeatedly measure the complete
relevant belief distribution incentive-compatibly. We find that subjects (1) place approximately full
weight on their priors, but (2) are asymmetric, over-weighting positive feedback relative to negative,
and (3) conservative, updating too little in response to both positive and negative signals. These biases
are substantially less pronounced in a placebo experiment where ego is not at stake. We also find that
(4) a substantial portion of subjects are averse to receiving information about their ability, and that
(5) less confident subjects are causally more likely to be averse. We unify these phenomena by showing


























An online appendix is available at:
http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w170141 Introduction
Standard economic theory assumes that agents process information about their own ability as
dispassionate Bayesians do. Social psychologists have questioned this assumption by pointing
out that people systematically rate their own ability as “above average.” To take one classic
and widely cited example, 88% of US drivers consider themselves safer than the median driver
(Svenson 1981).1 A quickly expanding literature in behavioral economics (Koszegi 2006) and
ﬁnance (Barber and Odean 2001, Malmendier and Tate 2008) has explored the implications of
overconﬁdence for economic decision-making.
At the same time, economists have pointed out that much of the commonly cited evidence
on biased information processing is in fact consistent with fully rational information processing.
Z´ abojn´ ık (2004) and Benoit and Dubra (forthcoming) have shown that Bayesian updating can
easily generate highly skewed belief distributions. For example, if there are equally many safe
and unsafe drivers and only unsafe drivers have accidents, then a majority of drivers — the
good drivers and the bad drivers who have not yet had accidents — will rate themselves safer
than average. People might also disagree on the deﬁnition of what constitutes a safe driver
(Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005) or tend to (rationally) choose activities for which they over-rate
their abilities (Van den Steen 2004). As these arguments illustrate, inference about information
processing from cross-sectional data is intrinsically diﬃcult.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we analyze theoretically the problem of opti-
mally managing one’s self-conﬁdence. Building on Brunnermeier and Parker’s (2005) concept
of optimal expectations, we show that agents who derive utility directly from their beliefs (for
example, ego or anticipatory utility) will exhibit a range of distinctive and measurable biases
in both the way they acquire and the way they process information. This lets us interpret tests
for these behaviors as tests of a uniﬁed theory, rather than tests for isolated behavioral anoma-
lies. Second, we implement these tests in a carefully controlled experimental environment. We
repeatedly elicit subjects’ beliefs about well-deﬁned events in an incentive-compatible manner
and study their evolution. In eﬀect, we sidestep the ambiguities inherent in cross-sectional
data by opening the “black box” of belief updating itself.
The model describes an agent who has either high or low ability. She will at some point
have to choose whether or not to take an action whose payoﬀ is positive only if her type is high,
so she places an instrumental value on information. She also derives utility from believing she
is the high type, however, which is interpretable as ego or anticipatory utility. We suppose
that the agent is a “biased Bayesian” updater who uses Bayes’ rule to process information but
decides at an initial stage how to interpret the informativeness of signals and how to value
1See Englmaier (2006) or Benoit and Dubra (forthcoming) for overviews of the evidence on over-conﬁdence.
2information, taking into account the competing demands of belief utility and decision-making.
When the weight placed on belief utility is zero, the model reproduces “perfect” (unbiased)
Bayesian updating.
Like other behavioral models ours can explain why agents are asymmetric updaters, putting
greater weight on positive information about their own ability than on negative information.
Our model also reveals close connections, however, between asymmetry and other biases. We
predict that agents are conservative, responding less than a perfect Bayesian would to infor-
mation. Intuitively, asymmetry on its own increases the agent’s mean belief in her ability in
the low state of the world. However, asymmetry also increases the variance of the low-type’s
beliefs: this increases the likelihood of costly investment mistakes where the low-type agent
takes the action appropriate for the high type. By also becoming conservative, the agent can
reduce the variance of her belief distribution in the bad state of the world. The model also
predicts that less conﬁdent agents will be information-averse, willing to pay to avoid learning
their types, since this would upset the careful balance they have struck between belief and
decision utility.
We test these predictions in a large-scale experiment with 656 undergraduate students.
Subjects ﬁrst perform an IQ test, after which we elicit their belief that they are among the
top half of performers. We then repeat the following procedure four times. We ﬁrst provide
each subject with an independent binary signal of their performance; each signal tells them
whether they are among the top or bottom half of performers and is correct with probability
75%. Second, after each signal we again elicit subjects’ beliefs that they are among the top
half of performers. By explicitly measuring priors and posteriors, and clearly deﬁning the
data-generating process, we eliminate the major confounds found in social psychology studies.
Repeating the process four times gives us a rich data set to study how beliefs change with
information.
Our focus on the binary event “scoring in the top half” is a novel and convenient design
feature that allows us to summarize relevant beliefs in a single number, the subjective prob-
ability of being among the top half of performers. This facilitates a further methodological
advance: we elicit beliefs by asking subjects for what value of x they would be indiﬀerent
between receiving a payoﬀ with probability x and receiving a payoﬀ if their score is among the
top half. Unlike the widely-used quadratic scoring mechanism, this approach is robust to risk
aversion, and also to non-standard models of preferences, provided these are monotonic in the
sense that lotteries that pay out a ﬁxed amount with higher probability are preferred.2
We estimate empirical speciﬁcations of belief updating that nest perfect Bayesian updating
2As Schlag and van der Weele (2009) discuss, our mechanism was also described by Allen (1987) and Grether
(1992) and has since been independently discovered by Karni (2009).
3and our own model of biased Bayesian updating. Consistent with both, we ﬁnd that information
is persistent in the sense that subjects’ priors are fully incorporated into their posteriors.
Consistent only with the latter, we ﬁnd that subjects are both conservative and asymmetric
updaters. On average our subjects revise their beliefs by only 35% as much as perfect Bayesians
with the same priors would. Moreover, subjects who receive positive feedback revise their
beliefs by 15% more on average than those who receive negative feedback. Strikingly, even
subjects who received two positive and two negative signals — and thus learned nothing —
ended up signiﬁcantly more conﬁdent than they began. We take this as unambiguous evidence
of self-serving bias.3
An important question about these results is whether they reﬂect motivated behavior as
posited by our model or merely cognitive limitations. It is, in fact, widely recognized that
standard Bayesian updating is an imperfect positive model even when self-conﬁdence is not
at stake.4 We conduct two tests to study whether our results reﬂect motivated behavior or
cognitive limitations. First, we show that agents who are of high ability according to our IQ
quiz, and hence arguably cognitively more able, are just as conservative and asymmetric as
those who score in the bottom half of the IQ quiz. Second, we conduct a placebo experiment,
structurally identical to our initial experiment except that subjects report beliefs about the
performance of a “robot” rather than their own performance. Belief updating in this second
experiment is signiﬁcantly and substantially closer to perfect Bayesian, implying that the desire
to manage self-conﬁdence is an important driver of updating biases.
We also measure subjects’ demand for feedback by allowing them to bid for noiseless infor-
mation on their relative performance. We then test the null hypothesis that subjects’ valuations
for feedback are weakly positive, as would hold if subjects used information purely to improve
their decision-making. On the contrary, we ﬁnd that approximately 10% of our subjects are
information-averse, willing to pay to avoid learning their type. We also ﬁnd that less conﬁdent
subjects are more likely to be information-averse, as predicted by our model. To address the
concern that conﬁdence may be correlated with other determinants of information demand,
we show that this result continues to hold when we instrument for conﬁdence using exogenous
3Evidence from psychology of “attribution biases” has two limitations in this regard: attribution does not
require learning, and much of the evidence provided for attribution bias is also consistent with perfect Bayesian
updating due to ambiguities in the experimental designs (Ajzen and Fishbein 1975, Wetzel 1982). We discuss
these issues in greater depth in Section 5.5.
4A large literature in psychology during the 1960s tested Bayes’ rule for ego-independent problems such
as predicting which urn a series of balls were drawn from; see Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971), Fischhoﬀ and
Beyth-Marom (1983), and Rabin (1998) for reviews. See also Grether (1980), Grether (1992) and El-Gamal
and Grether (1995) testing whether agents use the “representativeness heuristic” proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky (1973). Charness and Levin (2005) test for reinforcement learning and the role of aﬀect using revealed
preference data to draw inferences about how subjects update. Rabin and Schrag (1999) and Rabin (2002)
study the theoretical implications of speciﬁc cognitive forecasting and updating biases.
4variation generated by our experimental design.
Our results provide support for recent theories that imply a demand for self-conﬁdence man-
agement. In one strand of this literature, self-conﬁdence directly enhances well-being (Akerlof
and Dickens 1982, Caplin and Leahy 2001, Brunnermeier and Parker 2005, Koszegi 2006),
while other papers examine self-conﬁdence as a means to compensate for limited self-control
(Brocas and Carrillo 2000, Benabou and Tirole 2002) or to enhance performance (Compte
and Postlewaite 2004). These models diﬀer in their assumptions about how people manage
their self-conﬁdence, some emphasizing updating, others information acquisition, and others
selective memory. Our results suggest that the ﬁrst two mechanisms are relevant (but do not
bear on the third, given the short time frame of the experiment).
The most closely related empirical work is by Eil and Rao (forthcoming), who use the
quadratic scoring rule to repeatedly elicit beliefs about intelligence and beauty. Their ﬁndings
on updating (agents’ posteriors are less predictable and less sensitive to signal strength after
receiving negative feedback) are not directly comparable with ours (persistence, asymmetry,
and conservatism) due to diﬀerences in the design of the experiment and methods of analysis,
but are broadly consistent with motivated information processing. Their estimates of infor-
mation demand match ours — subjects with low conﬁdence are averse to further feedback —
though they treat conﬁdence as exogenous.5
Finally, this paper also contributes to the research on gender diﬀerences in conﬁdence. A
large literature in psychology and a growing one in economics have emphasized that men tend
to be more (over-)conﬁdent than women, with important economic implications. There are
three possible sources for gender diﬀerences in conﬁdence: they could be driven by gender
diﬀerences in priors, gender diﬀerences in updating about beliefs, and gender diﬀerences in
demand for information. Our experiment is designed to answer which combination of these
factors is present. We ﬁnd that in our data women diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their priors, are
signiﬁcantly more conservative updaters than men while not signiﬁcantly more asymmetric,
and signiﬁcantly more likely to be averse to feedback. These gender diﬀerences are consistent
with our theoretical framework if a larger proportion of women than men value belief utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
describes the details of our experimental design, and Section 4 summarizes the experimental
data. Section 5 discusses econometric methods and presents results for belief updating dy-
namics, and Section 6 presents results on information acquisition behavior. Section 7 discusses
gender diﬀerences, and Section 8 concludes.
5In other related work, Charness, Rustichini and Jeroen van de Ven (2011) ﬁnd that updating about own
relative performance is noisier than updating about objective events. Grossman and Owens (2010), using the
quadratic scoring rule and a smaller sample of 78 subjects, do not ﬁnd evidence of biased updating about
absolute performance.
52T h e o r y
We consider an agent who can either be of high type H or low type L.6 There are T discrete
time periods and the agent observes i.i.d. binary signals about her type in each period; T thus
measures the information-richness of the environment. For τ ∈ [0,1] we associate with relative
time τ the corresponding absolute time  τT .
In period 1 ≤ ˜ T ≤ T the agent has to decide whether to make an investment at cost c that
pays 1 in the ﬁnal period if she is of high type and 0 otherwise.7 Not investing gives utility 0.
Both the timing of the investment period ˜ T and the cost c are ex ante unknown to the agent.
Nature chooses ˜ T with equal probability among periods 1 to T and the cost c from a twice
continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing distribution G ∈ C2[0,1] over the interval
[0,1]. The timeline of the model is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timeline of model
t =0
Agent has subjec-
tive prior belief μ0
of being of type H
t =1 t =2 (..) t = ˜ T
Agent receives binary signals in period t =1 ,..,T
about her type and derives a posterior belief.
t = T
Cost c realized; agent chooses
whether to invest.
We ﬁrst analyze this model under the assumption that the agent is a “perfect Bayesian”
who uses the correct signal distribution when applying Bayes’ rule to form a posterior. We
then examine the information processing of an “optimally biased Bayesian” who also uses
Bayes’ rule but can choose at time t = 0 how to interpret the informativeness of positive and
negative signals. The biased Bayesian derives utility from believing that she is a high-type
agent. Biased information processing can increase belief utility at the cost of being more likely
to make the wrong investment decision.
6The binary nature of types anticipates our experimental design in which a subject’s type is either “scoring
in the top half” or not.
7The assumption that the instrumental value of investing is realized in the last period simpliﬁes our calcula-
tion of belief utility because the agent only learns her type in the ﬁnal period and therefore manages her belief
utility over all time periods 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
62.1 Information Processing of a “Perfect Bayesian”
The agent has a subjective prior belief μ0 ∈ (0,1) that she is a high type and in each period
t =1 ,..,T receives a binary signal st ∈{ H,L} about her type. The signals are conditionally
independently distributed: a high type agent receives a high signal with probability p and a
low type agent receives a high signal with probability q<p . The perfect Bayesian derives her
posterior μt using Bayes’ rule. In the investment period ˜ T the agent will invest if μ
˜ T >c ,t h a t
is, if she is suﬃciently sure that her type is high.8 Denote by St
H (St
L)t h en u m b e ro fH (L)
























denote the log likelihood
ratios or informativeness of positive and negative signals. The vector   λ =( λH,λ L) summarizes
the signal structure of the game.
Logit-beliefs evolve as a random walk with a drift that depends on the agent’s type. The
ex-ante expected logit-belief γt
H (γt
L) of a high (low) type agent are, respectively,
γt
H = logit(μ0)+t[pλH +( 1− p)λL]( 2 )
γt
L = logit(μ0)+t[qλH +( 1− q)λL]( 3 )
with γt
H increasing and γt
L decreasing over time. The standard deviations σt
H and σt
L of the
two types’ logit-beliefs evolve as
σt
H




2 = tq(1 − q)(λH − λL)
2 . (5)
Figure 2 graphs the distribution of beliefs for high and low type agents. The solid lines
show the evolving mean logit-beliefs of low and high types while the two curves indicate that
the distribution of logit-beliefs in the investment period ˜ T will be approximately normally
distributed for large ˜ T. The graph is useful for understanding the investment decision of the
perfect Bayesian for large T. The agent will invest at time T if and only if her logit-belief is
greater than the realized cutoﬀ logit(c). As the agent accumulates more and more signals, the
mean logit-beliefs of the low and high type agents converge to minus and plus inﬁnity at rate
T, respectively. At the same time, the standard deviation increases only at rate
√
T in both
cases. Therefore, the agent will make fewer and fewer investment mistakes as T →∞because
8We adopt the tie-breaking convention that an indiﬀerent agent does not invest.

















the probability that her logit-belief is on the correct side of the cutoﬀ converges to 1 in each
state. The expected utility of the low and high type agents will converge to 0 and 1 − E(c),
respectively, where E(c)=
  1
0 xdG(x) is the expected investment cost.
Proposition 1 The expected utility of a perfect Bayesian decision-maker who makes an in-
vestment decision at time ˜ T is μ0(1 − E(c)) + O(exp(−a˜ T)) for some constant a>0.
All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Information Processing of a “Biased Bayesian”
The “biased Bayesian” diﬀers in two dimensions from the perfect Bayesian. First, the biased
Bayesian derives direct belief utility ˆ μt(1 − E(c)) in every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T and cares about
maintaining a high mean belief over the time interval [0,T]. By deﬁning preferences directly
over beliefs, we follow the growing literature in behavioral economics in which agents derive
utility from their beliefs in non-standard ways.9 Note, that the agent’s belief utility is linear in
her subjective belief ˆ μt and hence does not predispose the agent to either a high or low demand
for information: concavity in the belief utility function tends to generate information aversion
9The literature has examined various mechanisms including direct “ego” utility (Akerlof and Dickens 1982,
Koszegi 2006), utility from the anticipation of future events (Caplin and Leahy 2001, Brunnermeier and Parker
2005), self-conﬁdence as a means of compensating for a lack of self-control (Carrillo and Mariotti 2000, Benabou
and Tirole 2002), and conﬁdence-enhanced performance (Compte and Postlewaite 2004).
8(see, for example, Koszegi (2006)) and we will show that aversion is a rational strategy in our
model even with linear belief utility. The scaling factor 1 − E(c) allows us to motivate belief
utility as a form of anticipatory utility of a perfect Bayesian who expects to learn her type
with probability one before acting and whose expected utility is therefore ˆ μt(1 − E(c)).
Second, we allow the biased Bayesian to choose at time t = 0 how to interpret the informa-
tiveness of positive and negative signals, as well as her initial belief. Formally, she chooses to
believe that the log-likelihood ratio of a positive signal is ˆ λH > 0 and that of a negative signal
ˆ λL < 0, along with an initial belief ˆ μ0. The vector   ˆ λ =( ˆ λH, ˆ λL) thus summarizes how the





λL as the decision-maker’s relative responsiveness to negative and positive information,
respectively; we will directly estimate these parameters in our experiment.
The biased Bayesian’s posterior belief ˆ μt evolves according to Bayes’ rule but using her
chosen interpretations:
logit(ˆ μt) = logit(ˆ μ0)+St
Hˆ λH + St
Lˆ λL. (6)
We denote the mean logit-beliefs of the low and high type biased Bayesian with ˆ γt
L and ˆ γt
H and
the standard deviations with ˆ σt
L and ˆ σt
H.10 We deﬁne the total utility of the decision-maker as
the sum of average belief utility and realized utility from actual investment in the investment
period:








ˆ μt(1 − E(c))

















Note that the outer expectation is taken over all possible signal realizations {st}T
t=1, which de-
termine μt and ˆ μt; importantly, this expectation is evaluated using the correct data generating
process described by μ0 and   λ.11
The parameter α captures the relative importance of belief utility. We assume 0 ≤ α<
E(c)
1−E(c), which we refer to as the long-term learning condition. It ensures that the biased
Bayesian, if she knew she were in fact the low type, would not want to bias her beliefs so
10Formally, these expressions are deﬁned through Equations 2–5 replacing μ
0, λH and λL with ˆ μ
0, ˆ λH and
ˆ λL.
11In our model, the belief and real utility generated in every period receives weight
1
T . The analysis of our
model would not change if we would introduce discounting, as long as both belief and real utility were discounted
at the same rate. If period ˜ T is not chosen uniformly, then our steady state analysis would no longer apply;
Proposition 3 would still hold, however, as long as the minimum probability of taking an action in any period t
is bounded below by
m
T for some m>0.
9extremely as to convince herself she was the high type. (Such a bias would generate belief
utility α(1 − E(c)) at a cost of E(c), resulting in negative net utility.) Read as a condition on
α, long-run learning requires that α be suﬃciently low; for example, if the cost distribution G
is uniform over [0,1], then the long-term learning condition is α<1. Alternatively, long-run
learning rules out distributions where most of the mass is close to zero, since in that case there
is little cost to biasing one’s belief. Note that when the long-run learning condition holds, the
trade-oﬀ between belief utility and decision-making binds and hence we do not need to appeal
to any additional cognitive costs to impose any limit on self-deception.
2.3 Optimally Biased Bayesians
The optimally biased Bayesian chooses (ˆ μ0,  ˆ λ) to maximize her utility (7). Note that in stan-
dard models, perfectly Bayesian beliefs are self-consistent in the sense that the decision-maker
would not wish to alter her beliefs if she could. While in our model this property will not
generally hold when α>0, we recover the standard model when α =0 :
Proposition 2 An optimally biased Bayesian who derives no utility from anticipation (α =0 )
processes information like a perfect Bayesian and always chooses βH = βL =1 .
In order to describe the optimal Bayesian bias when the decision-maker has belief utility
(α>0), we introduce the notions of conservatism and asymmetry.
Deﬁnition 1 We say that a biased Bayesian is conservative if the agent’s relative responsive-
ness to positive information (βH) and to negative information (βL) are less than 1.W es a y
that the agent is asymmetric if her relative responsiveness to positive information is greater
than her relative responsiveness to negative information, that is, if βH >β L.
Our next result shows that, for large T, optimally biased Bayesian decision-makers are both
asymmetric and conservative.
Proposition 3 The responsiveness of the optimally biased Bayesian to both positive and neg-
ative information converges to 0 as T →∞ , so that for suﬃciently large T she is conservative.
Moreover, the optimally biased Bayesian is asymmetric for suﬃciently large T.
The intuition for the tight connection between asymmetry and conservatism is the following:
a biased Bayesian can only increase her belief utility by preventing her future self from fully
learning her true type in the low state of the world (in the high state, the unbiased Bayesian
already enjoys high belief and realized utility as her belief quickly converges to 1). Asymmetry
partially achieves this by pivoting the mean logit-belief lines in Figure 2 upwards. Asymmetry
does not hurt the high type and can slow or even eliminate the drift of mean logit-beliefs of a
10perfect Bayesian in the low state towards −∞ (as indicated in Figure 3). However, asymmetry
without conservatism makes the low type agent’s belief very volatile: her belief will often
be very high, which exposes the agent to costly mistakes. The optimally biased Bayesian
can reduce belief volatility in the low state by also becoming conservative: this allows her to
maintain a level of self-conﬁdence that remains bounded away from zero without ever becoming
too high and inducing her to overinvest.12 Conversely, conservatism alone is insuﬃcient to
implement the optimal Bayesian bias. While conservatism can keep the low type’s belief high,
it also prevents the high type from learning her type.
We can obtain a tighter characterization of the optimal Bayesian bias under some weak
additional assumptions. The key idea is to ﬁrst solve the optimally biased Bayesian’s problem
for an environment where she can freely choose her beliefs in every period t and for both
states H and L. This environment is less restricted than our model where beliefs have to
be derived through Bayes’ rule, albeit with modiﬁed informativeness of signals. Let ˜ μ∗
H,t and
˜ μ∗
L,t denote solutions to this relaxed problem. Clearly, the decision-maker would set ˜ μ∗
H,t =1 ,
which maximizes both her belief utility and her realized utility, conditional on being the high
type. She would choose μ∗
L,t to maximize




Note that this problem is independent of t, as we are considering an agent who can choose
beliefs for each period independently. The diﬀerentiable function Lα(μL) always has an interior
maximum 0 <μ ∗
L < 1.13
For large T, the biased Bayesian can approximate the utility achieved in the solution of
this unrestricted problem through the following bias which we term downward-neutral bias:
 
ˆ μ0 T = μ∗
L
ˆ λT
H = T−θλH,where 1
2 <θ<1
ˆ λT
L = −T−θ q
1 − q
λH (9)
Figure 3 illustrates the downward neutral bias by plotting the evolution of induced beliefs in
the high and low state. This bias has three important properties: (a) the low type’s logit-
belief follows a driftless random walk, which allows her to maintain her initial logit-belief in
12Epstein, Noor and Sandroni (2010), studying the class of updating dynamics axiomatized in Epstein, Noor
and Sandroni (2008) make the related point that an agent who over-weights new information relative to his
prior may converge to an incorrect forecast.
13We know that Lα(0) = 0 and Lα(1) < 0. Moreover, for small μL we have Lα(μL) > 0b e c a u s eG
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expectation; (b) the agent is asymmetric and responds relatively more strongly to positive
than to negative information than a perfect Bayesian does; (c) the agent becomes increasingly
conservative, which ensures that the low type’s actual logit-belief stays close to its mean.
Lemma 2 in the Appendix shows that as T →∞the expected payoﬀ from the downward
neutral bias converges to the agent’s payoﬀ in the unrestricted problem: the downward-neutral
bias induces beliefs at any ﬁxed relative time τ, which converge in probability to 1 in the high
state while low state beliefs stay within an arbitrarily close neighborhood around μ∗
L,w i t h
probability approaching 1.
We now show that the downward-neutral bias essentially characterizes the optimal Baysian
bias:
Proposition 4 If Lα(μL) has a unique maximum at μ∗
L and L  
α(μ∗
L) < 0, then the following
hold as T →∞ : (a) the agent’s initial belief at time 0, ˆ μ0, converges to μ∗
L; (b) the ratio of
the agent’s responsiveness to positive versus negative information converges to
1−q
q (so that
the ratio of the optimally biased Bayesian’s relative responsiveness to positive and negative
information is strictly greater than 1 in the limit); and (c) the agent’s responsiveness to both
positive and negative information converges to 0 faster than
√
T, that is, (ˆ λT




Moreover, at any relative time τ>0, the agent’s high state belief converges in probability to 1,
while the agent’s low state belief converges in probability to μ∗
L.
The condition on Lα holds, for example, for any cost distribution that is uniform or has an
increasing density. The proof proceeds by showing that any sequence of strategies that does
not have one of the given properties must yield a strictly lower asymptotic payoﬀ than the
12Figure 4: Bayesian and Biased Bayesian Strategies: Numerical Optima for Finite T
(a) Relative Responsiveness








































Plots of optimal strategies for the perfect Bayesian (α = 0, solid lines) and optimally biased Bayesian (α =0 .5,
dotted lines) cases. (4a) plots responsiveness to positive and negative signals (βH and −βL)f o r1≤ T ≤ 80.
(4b) plots information values for realizable values of ˆ μ
[τT] for T = 31, and [τT] = 10. The remaining parameters
are ﬁxed in both cases at μ
0 =0 .5, c ∼ U[0,1], p =0 .75, q =0 .25
(feasible) downward-neutral bias, a contradiction. The result shows that there is no tradeoﬀ in
the limit between maintaining a moderate belief in one’s ability in the low state while rapidly
converging to a high belief in the high state. Interestingly, Proposition 4 has no role for the
initial prior μ0. In particular, the optimal initial belief ˆ μ0 does not depend on μ0 for large
T: the empirical content of the proposition, just like the focus of our experiment, concerns
information acquisition and processing.
Proposition 4 characterizes optimal behavior for large T, or in other words, as the environ-
ment becomes information-rich. For ﬁnite T, the model is amenable to numerical optimization:
since the set of possible signal realizations is also ﬁnite, we can calculate the optimal policy
exactly without Monte Carlo techniques. Figure 4a shows the calculated optimal policy for
the case α = 1
2, μ0 = 1
2 and uniform cost distribution over the range 1 ≤ T ≤ 80. Signals are
symmetric and each signal is correct with probability 0.75. The calculations conﬁrm that the
decision-maker rapidly becomes both conservative and asymmetric for ﬁnite T.
2.4 Value of Information
We now analyze how biased agents value information. Suppose that at relative time τ ab i a s e d
Bayesian with subjective belief x who has not yet made an investment decision is presented
13with an opportunity to purchase a perfectly informative signal. We are interested in the agent’s
willingness to pay, WTP(x,τ). Consistent with our modeling approach we assume that the
decision-maker chooses her willingness to pay at time 0. To simplify our analysis and build
on the results from the previous section, we assume that the decision-maker does not take the
possibility of buying information into account when choosing her bias. This assumption seems
appropriate when the probability of purchasing information is small.
To derive WTP(x,τ) we ﬁrst characterize the biased Bayesian’s utility at relative time τ
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We take the expectation over all signal realizations {st}T
t=1 such that ˆ μ τT  = x.S i n c e t h e
biased Bayesian’s belief can take on at most  τT  + 1 distinct values at relative time τ,t h i s
expectation is only deﬁned for those values. Note that belief utility becomes relatively less
important than realized utility as τ increases because there are only T −  τT  +1p e r i o d s
left. In fact, the biased Bayesian’s total utility at relative time τ equals the utility of a biased
agent at time 0 who weighs belief utility with weight α
T− τT +1
T , has initial belief x, and faces
T −  τT  +1pe r i od s .
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(11)
We can now formally deﬁne the agent’s willingness to pay for information:
WTP(x,τ)=Uinfo(x,τ) − Unoinfo(x,τ) (12)
In the special case where the agent is a perfect Bayesian (α = 0) and takes an action immedi-
14Note that each sample path determining ˆ μ
t also uniquely determines μ
t.
14ately (τ = 1), the above expression reduces to the short-term willingness to pay WTPS(x):
WTPS(x)=x(1 − E(c)) −
  x
0
(x − c)dG(c) (13)
It is easy to see that WTPS(x) is zero when x =0o rx = 1 and strictly positive for 0 <x<1:
a perfect Bayesian decision-maker values information the least when she is sure about her
ability. Moreover, the short-term willingness to pay for information is never negative.
Our ﬁrst result looks at the willingness to pay for information of the perfect Bayesian:
Lemma 1 Consider some belief 0 <x<1 and relative time 0 <τ<1. The perfect Bayesian’s
willingness to pay, WTP(x,τ), converges to zero as T →∞ .
The intuition for this result is simply that with enough periods to go and imprecise beliefs
(0 <x<1), the perfect Bayesian will accumulate suﬃcient information to take the correct
action with probability approaching 1. Hence, the value of a perfect signal converges to zero.
In contrast, an optimally biased Bayesian’s asymptotic valuation can be either positive or
negative:
Proposition 5 Consider a biased Bayesian who places weight α>0 on belief utility. Fix




Intuitively, for any x<1 the agent is likely to be a low type because otherwise her logit-beliefs
would have converged rapidly to 1. Proposition 4 implies that her beliefs in the low state
follow a driftless random walk with vanishing variance and hence stay around x. This implies
that her utility over the remaining relative time 1 − τ is approximately Lα(1−τ)(x). Buying
information, on the other hand, would reveal her to be a low type and yield a payoﬀ of 0.
The diﬀerence −Lα(1−τ)(x) is negative for low values of x since in that region the beneﬁts of
sustaining belief utility exceed the costs of mistaken choices, but positive for high values of x
since in that region this relationship is reversed. Thus Proposition 5 implies that the biased
Bayesian will have a negative value of information when her belief is low and a positive value
of information when her belief is high.
Figure 4b plots an example of the numerical demands generated by our model for both
an unbiased and a biased Bayesian. In the former case, information is valued most highly at
intermediate beliefs where uncertainty is highest; in the latter case, valuations are negative for
low levels of conﬁdence but then are positive above a threshold level of conﬁdence.
Proposition 5 characterizes the biased Bayesian’s preferred demand function if she could
commit in advance to information demand at time τ. We can also characterize her demand
15function in the absence of commitment. In keeping with our earlier assumptions, consider a
“naive biased Bayesian” who evaluates the return to acquiring information at relative time τ
using belief x that she is the high type and believing that the remaining signals she will receive
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(15)
Note that the agent believes that her beliefs are correct and that   ˆ λ accurately describes the
data-generating process. This implies that (i) belief utility does not enter into the expression
for WTPNBB(x,τ), and (ii) she evaluates future decision utility using ˆ μt rather than μt.W e
can then show:





Intuitively, the optimally biased agent updates her beliefs so slowly that she does not expect
to learn much until taking an action. Hence, the Bayesian component of her willingness to
pay converges to a perfect Bayesian’s immediate value of information. Comparing this to
Proposition 5 we see that the period 0 self prefers to impose a strong dislike for information on
future selves with low self-conﬁdence but an additional taste for information on future selves
with high self-conﬁdence.
3 Experimental Design and Methodology
The aim of the experiment is twofold: to test how agents update their beliefs when they receive
noisy feedback, and to assess their demand for information. To understand the mapping from
the model into the experiment, recall that in the model agents cared about the level of their
beliefs because of belief utility and about the accuracy of their beliefs because of an anticipated
future decision. In the experiment we study subjects’ beliefs about their performance in an
IQ quiz. Participants may obtain utility from beliefs about their relative performance in an
IQ quiz for a variety of reasons: because they want to believe they are intelligent (ego utility),
because they want to believe their future is bright (anticipatory utility), or because they believe
conﬁdence will enhance their subsequent motivation or performance. At the same time relative
IQ is potentially an important factor to take into account when making future decisions. We
think of these as being outside of the experiment, as for example when subjects make future
educational and career choices.
16The experiment consisted of four stages, which are explained in detail below. During the
quiz stage, a subject completed an online IQ test. We measured each subject’s belief about
being among the top half of performers both before the IQ quiz and after the IQ quiz. During
the feedback stage we repeated the following protocol four times. First, a subject receives a
binary signal that indicates whether the subject was among the top half of performers that was
correct with 75% probability. We then measure each subject’s belief about being among the top
half of performers. Overall, subjects receive four independent signals, and we track subjects’
updated beliefs after each signal. In the information purchasing stage we gave subjects the
opportunity to purchase precise information about whether her performance put her in the top
half of all performers. A sub-sample of subjects were invited one month later for a follow-up
which repeated the feedback stage but with reference to the performance of a robot rather
than to their own performance.
3.1 Quiz Stage
Subjects had four minutes to answer as many questions as possible out of 30. Since the
experiment was web-based and diﬀerent subjects took the test at diﬀerent times, we randomly
assigned each subject to one of 9 diﬀerent versions of the IQ test. Subjects were informed that
their performance would be compared to the performance of all other students taking the same
test version. The tests consisted of standard logic questions such as:
Question: Which one of the ﬁve choices makes the best comparison? LIVED is to
DEVIL as 6323 is to (i) 2336, (ii) 6232, (iii) 3236, (iv) 3326, or (v) 6332.
Question: A fallacious argument is (i) disturbing, (ii) valid, (iii) false, or (iv)
necessary?
A subject’s ﬁnal score was the number of correct answers minus the number of incorrect
answers. Earnings for the quiz were the score multiplied by $0.25. During the same period
an unrelated experiment on social learning was conducted and the combined earnings of all
parts of all experiments were transferred to subjects’ university debit cards at the end of the
study. Since earnings were variable and not itemized (and even diﬀered across IQ tests), it
would have been very diﬃcult for subjects to infer their relative performance from earnings.
Types. Subjects with IQ scores above the median for their particular IQ quiz correspond
to high types in our model, those with scores below the median to low types. Because types are
binary, a subject’s belief about her type at any point in time is given by a single number,h e r
subjective probability of being a high type. This will prove crucial when devising incentives
17to elicit beliefs, and distinguishes our work from much of the literature where only several
moments of more complicated belief distributions are elicited.15
3.2 Feedback Stage
Signal Accuracy. Signals were independent and correct with probability 75%: if a subject
was among the top half of performers, she would get a “Top” signal with probability p =0 .75
and a “Bottom” signal with probability 1 − p. If a subject was among the bottom half of
performers, she would get a Top signal with probability q =0 .25 and a Bottom signal with
probability 1 − q. The informativeness of Top and Bottom signals was therefore λH =l n ( 3 )
and λL = −ln(3), respectively. To explain the accuracy of signals over the web, subjects were
told that the report on their performance would be retrieved by one of two “robots” — “Wise
Bob” or “Joke Bob.” Each was equally likely to be chosen. Wise Bob would correctly report
Top or Bottom. Joke Bob would return a random report using Top or Bottom with equal
probability. We explained that this implied that the resulting report would be correct with
75% probability.
Belief elicitation. We used a novel crossover mechanism each time we elicited beliefs.
Subjects were presented with two options,
1. Receive $3 if their score was among the top half of scores (for their quiz version).
2. Receive $3 with probability x ∈{ 0,0.01,0.02,...,0.99,1}.
and asked for what value of x they would be indiﬀerent between them. We then draw a random
number y ∈{ 0,0.01,0.02,...,0.99,1}. Subjects were paid $3 with probability y when y>xand
otherwise received $3 when their own score was among the top half of scores. To present this
mechanism in a simple narrative form, we told subjects that they were paired with a “robot”
who had a ﬁxed but unknown probability y between 0 and 100% of scoring among the top half
of subjects. Subjects could base their chance of winning $3 on either their own performance
or their robot’s, and had to indicate the threshold level of x above which they preferred to use
the robot’s performance. We explained to subjects that they would maximize their probability
of earning the $3 by choosing their own subjective probability of being in the top half as the
threshold. Subjects were told at the outset that we would elicit their beliefs several times but
would implement only one choice at random for payment.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper to implement the crossover mechanism
in an experiment.16 The crossover mechanism has two main advantages over the quadratic
15For example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) elicit the mode of subjects’ beliefs about their rank in groups
of 4.
16After running our experiment we became aware that the same mechanism was also independently discovered
by Allen (1987) and Grether (1992), and has since been proposed by Karni (2009).
18scoring rule commonly used in experimental papers. First, quadratic scoring is truth-inducing
only for risk-neutral subjects;17 the crossover mechanism is strictly incentive-compatible pro-
vided only that subjects’ preferences are monotone in the sense that among lotteries that pay
$3 with probability q and $0 with probability 1−q, they strictly prefer those with higher q.T h i s
property holds for all von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences as well as for many non-standard
preferences such as Prospect theory.
A second advantage is that the crossover mechanism does not generate perverse incentives
to “hedge” performance on the quiz. Consider the incentives facing a subject who has predicted
that she will score in the top half with probability ˆ μ. Under a quadratic scoring rule she will
earn a piece rate of $0.25 per point she scores and lose an amount proportional to (IS≥S − ˆ μ)2,
where S is her score and S the median score. If she believes the latter to be distributed
according to F then her total payoﬀ is
$0.25 · S − k ·
 
(IS≥S − ˆ μ)2dF(S) (17)
for some k>0; this may be decreasing in S for low values of ˆ μ, generating incentives to
“hedge.” In contrast, her quiz payoﬀ under the crossover mechanism is
$0.25 ∗ S +$ 3 .00 ∗ ˆ μ ∗
 
IS≥SdF(S), (18)
which unambiguously increases with S. Intuitively, conditional on her own performance being
the relevant one (which happens with probability ˆ μ), she always wants to do the best she can.
3.3 Information Purchasing Stage
In the ﬁnal stage of the experiment we elicited subjects’ demand for noiseless feedback on
their relative performance. Subjects stated their willingness to pay for the following bundles:
receiving $2, receiving $2 and receiving feedback through a private email, or receiving $2 and
receiving feedback on a web page visible to all study participants as well as by email. We
oﬀered two variants of the latter two bundles, one in which subjects learned whether they
scored in the top half or not, and another in which they learned their exact quantile in the
score distribution. In total, subjects thus bid for ﬁve bundles. We bounded responses between
$0.00 and $4.00.
One of the choices was randomly selected and subjects purchased the corresponding bundle
if and only if their reservation price exceeded a randomly generated price. This design is a
17See Oﬀerman, Sonnemans, Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2009) for an overview of the risk problem for scoring
rules and a proposed risk-correction. One can of course eliminate distortions entirely by not paying subjects,
but unpaid subjects tend to report inaccurate and incoherent beliefs (Grether 1992).
19standard application of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM), with the twist that
we measure information values by netting out subjects’ valuations for $2 alone from their other
valuations. This addresses the concern that subjects may under-bid for objective-value prizes.
3.4 Follow-up Stage
We invited a random sub-sample of subjects through email to a follow-up experiment one
month later. Subjects were told they had been paired with a robot who had a probability
θ of being a high type. We then repeated the feedback stage of the experiment except that
this time subjects received signals of the robot’s ability and we tracked their beliefs about the
r o b o tb e i n gah i g ht y p e .
The purpose of this follow-up was to compare subjects’ processing of information about
a robot’s ability as opposed to their own ability. To make this within-subject treatment as
eﬀective as possible, we matched experimental conditions in the follow-up as closely as possible
to those in the baseline. We set the robot’s initial probability of being a high type, θ,t ot h e
multiple of 5% closest to the subject’s post-IQ quiz conﬁdence. For example, if the subject
had reported a conﬁdence level of 63% after the quiz we would pair the subject with a robot
that was a high type with probability θ = 65%. We then randomly picked a high or low type
robot for each subject with probability θ. If the type of the robot matched the subject’s type
in the earlier experiment then we generated the same sequence of signals for the robot. If the
types were diﬀerent, we chose a new sequence of signals. In either case, signals were correctly
distributed conditional on the robot’s type.
4D a t a
4.1 Subject Pool
The experiment was conducted in April 2005 as part of a larger sequence of experiments at a
large private university with an undergraduate student body of around 6,400. A total of 2,356
students signed up in November 2004 to participate in this series of experiments by clicking
a link on their home page on www.facebook.com, a popular social networking site.18 These
students were invited by email to participate in the belief updating study, and 1,058 of them
accepted the invitation and completed the experiment online. This ﬁnal sample is 45% male
and distributed across academic years as follows: 26% seniors, 28% juniors, 30% sophomores,
and 17% freshmen. Our sample includes about 33% of all sophomores, juniors, and seniors
18In November 2004 more than 90% of students were members of the site and at least 60% of members logged
into the site daily.
20enrolled during the 2004–2005 academic year, and is thus likely to be unusually representative
of the student body as a whole.
An important concern with an online experiment is whether subjects understood and were
willing to follow instructions. In light of that concern, our software required subjects to make
an active choice each time they submitted a belief — they were free to report beliefs that are
clearly inconsistent with both perfect and biased Bayesian updating, such as updates in the
wrong direction and neutral updates (reporting the same belief as in the previous round). After
each of the 4 signals, a stable proportion of about 36% of subjects reported the same belief
as in the previous round.19 About 16% of subjects did not change their beliefs at all during
all four rounds of the feedback stage. In contrast, the share of subjects who updated in the
wrong direction declined over time (13%, 9%, 8% and 7%), and most subjects made at most
one mistake.20
For most of our analysis we use a restricted sample of subjects who (1) made no updates
in the wrong direction, and (2) revised their beliefs at least once. These restrictions exclude
25% and 13% of our sample, respectively, and leave us with 342 women and 314 men. We
view this exclusion as a conservative way to exclude subjects who misunderstood or ignored
the instructions. Our main conclusions hold on the full sample as well, however, and we also
provide those estimates as robustness checks where appropriate.
We invited 120 subjects to participate in the follow-up stage one month later, and 78
completed this ﬁnal stage of the experiment. The pattern of wrong and neutral moves was
similar to the ﬁrst stage of the experiment. Slightly fewer subject made neutral updates (28%
of all updates) and 10% always made neutral updates. Slightly more subjects made wrong
updates (22% made one mistake, 10% made two mistakes, 5% made three mistakes and 3%
made 4 mistakes). The restricted sample for the follow-up has 39 subjects.
4.2 Quiz Scores
The mean score of the 656 subjects was 7.4 (s.d. 4.8), generated by 10.2 (s.d. 4.3) correct
answers and 2.7 (s.d. 2.1) incorrect answers. The distribution of quiz scores (number of correct
answers minus number of incorrect answers) is approximately normal, with a handful of outliers
who appear to have guessed randomly. The most questions answered by a subject was 29, so
the 30-question limit did not induce bunching at the top of the distribution. Table A-1 in the
supplementary appendix provides further descriptive statistics broken down by gender and by
quiz type. An important observation is that the 9 versions of the quiz varied substantially in
19The exact proportions were 36%, 39%, 37% and 36% for the four rounds, respectively.
20Overall, 19% of subjects made only one mistake, 6% made two mistake, 2% made 3 mistakes and 0.4%
made 4 mistakes.
21diﬃculty, with mean scores on the easiest version (#6) ﬁves time higher than on the hardest
version (#5). Subjects who were randomly assigned to harder quiz versions were signiﬁcantly
less conﬁdent that they had scored in the top half after taking the quiz, presumably because
they attributed some of their diﬃculty in solving the quiz to being a low type.21 We will
exploit this variation below, using quiz assignment as an instrument for beliefs.
5 Information Processing
In this section we analyze belief updating in the feedback and follow-up stages, comparing our
model’s predictions to the perfect Bayesian benchmark.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Figure 5 plots the empirical cumulative distribution function of subjects’ beliefs, directly after
the quiz and after four rounds of updating. Updating yields a ﬂatter distribution as mass shifts
towards 0 (for low types) and 1 (for high types). Note that the distribution of beliefs is quite
smooth and not merely bunched around a few focal numbers. This provides some support for
the idea that the new elicitation method generates reasonable answers.22
Our design with only two states (top half and bottom half of the distribution) allows us to
easily compare the belief updates of subjects to perfectly Bayesian updates. Figure 6 shows the
mean belief revision in response to a Top and Bottom signal by decile of prior belief in being a
top half type for each of the four observations of the 656 subjects. First, note that subjects are
conservative and update much less than the perfect Bayesian benchmark would predict. To
assess whether subjects update asymmetrically, Figure 7 compares subjects whose prior belief
was ˆ μ and who received positive feedback with subjects whose prior belief was 1− ˆ μ and who
received negative feedback. According to Bayes’ rule, the magnitude of the belief change in
these situations should be identical. However, Figure 7 shows that subjects tend to respond
more strongly to positive feedback. We will study both of these phenomena using a regression
approach next and will conﬁrm the pattern revealed by the ﬁgures.
21Moore and Healy (2008) document a similar pattern.
22In work in progress, Hollard, Massoni and Vergnaud (2010) compare beliefs obtained using several elicitation
procedures and show that using the crossover procedure results in the smoothest distribution of beliefs.
22Figure 5: Belief Distributions






















Empirical cumulative distributions of subjects’ beliefs following the quiz (Post Quiz) and after four rounds of
noisy feedback (Post Signal 4).
5.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Our empirical strategy mirrors the theory section, expressing information processing in terms
of the logistic function. For a (possibly biased) Bayesian,
logit(ˆ μt) = logit(ˆ μt−1)+I(sit = H) · ˆ λH + I(sit = L) · ˆ λL (19)
This motivates the following linear empirical speciﬁcation:
logit(ˆ μt
i)=δ · logit(ˆ μt−1































































































Mean belief revisions broken down by decile of prior belief in being of type “Top.” Responses to positive and
negative signals are plotted separately in the top and bottom halves, respectively. The corresponding means that
would have been observed if all subjects were perfect Bayesians are provided for comparison. T-bars indicate
95% conﬁdence intervals.
In our experiment, we have λH = −λL = ln(3), and the error term  it captures unsystematic
errors that subject i made when updating her belief at time t. Note that we do not have to
include a constant in this regression because I(sit = H)+I(sit = L)=1 . T h ec o e ﬃ c i e n t
δ captures the persistence of prior information; our model predicts δ =1f o rb o t hb i a s e d
and perfect Bayesians. The coeﬃcients βH and βL capture relative responsiveness to positive
and negative information and allow us to distinguish perfect and biased Bayesians. A perfect
Bayesian is fully responsive to positive and negative information (βH = βL = 1). In contrast,
a biased Bayesian is conservative — less responsive to new information overall (βH,β L < 1)
— and asymmetric — more responsive to positive than negative information (βH >β L).







































































Mean absolute belief revisions by decile of prior belief in being of type equal to the signal received. For example,
a subject with prior belief ˆ μ =0 .8 of being in the top half who received a signal T and a subject with prior
belief ˆ μ =0 .2w h or e c e i v e das i g n a lB are both plotted at x = 80%. T-bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
as a dependent variable. If there is unobserved heterogeneity in subjects’ responsiveness to
information, βL and βH, then OLS estimation may yield upwardly biased estimates of δ due
to correlation between the lagged logit-beliefs and the unobserved components βiL − βL and
βiH −βH in the error term. Removing individual-level heterogeneity through ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
or ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation does not solve this problem but rather introduces a negative bias
(Nickell 1981). In addition to these issues, there may be measurement error in self-reported
logit-beliefs because subjects make mistakes or are imprecise in recording their beliefs.23
23See Arellano and Honore (2001) for an overview of the issues raised in this paragraph. Instrumental
variables techniques have been proposed that use lagged diﬀerence as instruments for contemporaneous ones
(see, for example, Arellano and Bond (1991)); these instruments would be attractive here since the theory clearly
implies that the ﬁrst lag of beliefs should be a suﬃcient statistic for the entire preceding sequence of beliefs,
25To address these issues we exploit the fact that subjects’ random assignment to diﬀerent
versions of the IQ quiz generated substantial variation in their post-quiz beliefs. This allows
us to construct instruments for lagged prior logit-beliefs. For each subject i we calculate
the average quiz score of subjects other than i who took the same quiz variant to obtain a
measure of the quiz diﬃculty level that is not correlated with subject i’s own ability but highly
correlated with the subject’s beliefs. We will report both OLS and IV estimates of Equation
20.
5.3 Results from Feedback Stage
Table 1 presents round-by-round and pooled estimates of Equation 20.24 Estimates in Panel
A are via OLS and those in Panel B are via IV using quiz type indicators as instruments. The
F-statistics reported in Panel B indicate that our instrument is strong enough to rule out weak
instrument concerns (Stock and Yogo 2002).
Result 1 (Persistence) Subjects weigh prior information similarly to perfect Bayesian up-
daters.
Our model implies a coeﬃcient δ = 1 on prior logit-beliefs for both perfect and biased
Bayesians. OLS estimates for the early rounds of belief updating put it close to but sig-
niﬁcantly less than unity. Although it climbs by round, we fail to reject that it equals one
only in Round 4 (p =0 .57). These estimates may be biased upward by heterogeneity in the
responsiveness coeﬃcients, βiL and βiH, or may be biased downwards if subjects report beliefs
with noise. The IV estimates suggest that the latter bias is more important: the pooled point
estimate of 0.963 is larger and none of the estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity.
All told, we ﬁnd strong evidence that information persists once it has been incorporated into
agents’ beliefs.
Result 2 (Conservatism) Subjects respond less to both positive and negative information
than a perfect Bayesian.
Figure 6 suggests that our subjects respond less to new information than a perfect Bayesian.
This observation is reﬂected in the regressions. Our OLS estimates of βH and βL, 0.370 and
0.302, are substantially and signiﬁcantly less than unity. Round-by-round estimates do not
follow any obvious trend — therefore, this observation does not seem to be a mere cognitive
but unfortunately higher-order lags have little predictive power when the autocorrelation coeﬃcient δ is close
to one, as our model predicts for both perfect and biased Bayesians.
24The logit function is deﬁned only for priors and posteriors in (0,1); to balance the panel we further restrict
the sample to subjects i for whom this holds for all rounds t. Results using the ragged panel, which includes





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27error that can be reduced through practice. The IV and OLS estimates are almost identical,
suggesting there is little bias through correlation with lagged prior beliefs.
Result 3 (Asymmetry) Controlling for prior beliefs, subjects respond more to positive than
to negative signals.
The regressions also conﬁrm that subjects respond diﬀerently to positive and negative infor-
mation as suggested in Figure 7. To quantify asymmetry we compare estimates of βH and
βL, the responsiveness to positive and negative signals. The diﬀerence βH −βL is consistently
positive across all rounds and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the ﬁrst round, fourth round,
and for the pooled speciﬁcation. While estimates of this diﬀerence in Rounds 2 and 3 are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimates are equal
across all four rounds (p =0 .32). The IV estimates are somewhat more variable but are again
uniformly positive, and signiﬁcantly so in Rounds 1 and 4 and in the pooled speciﬁcation. The
size of the diﬀerence is substantial, implying that the eﬀect of receiving both a positive and a
negative signal (that is, no information) is 26% as large as the eﬀect of receiving only a positive
signal.25 As an alternative non-parametric test we can study the net change in beliefs among
the 224 subjects who received two positive and two negative signals. These subjects should
have ended with the same beliefs as they began; instead their beliefs increased by an average
of 4.8p o i n t s( p<0.001).
A key beneﬁt of our empirical design is that it not only rejects the perfect Baysian model
but shows us exactly in which ways it fails. If instead we simply regress subjects’ logit-beliefs
on those predicted by Bayes’ rule, we estimate a correlation of 0.57, which lets us reject the
perfect Bayesian null but does not disentangle persistence, conservatism, or asymmetry.
Finally, we can summarize the extent to which subjects deviate from perfect Bayesian
updating by comparing their payoﬀs πactual to those they would have earned if they updated
using Bayes’ rule (πBayes) or if they reported uniformly random posteriors (πrandom). The
ratio
πactual−πrandom
πBayes−πrandom is 0.64, implying that non-Bayesian updating behavior costs subjects 36%
of the potential gains from processing information within this experiment.
5.4 Conﬁdence Management or Cognitive Mistakes?
Our model of self-conﬁdence management explains both conservatism and asymmetry. How-
ever, there are other interpretations unrelated to ego that might explain some of our results.
For example, conservatism might arise if subjects are perfect Bayesians who simply misin-
terpret the informativeness of signals and believe that the signal is only correct with 60%
25Table A-2 in the supplementary appendix shows that the results of the regression continue to hold when
we pool all four rounds of observation, even when we eliminate all observations in which subjects do not change
their beliefs. That is, the eﬀect is not driven by an eﬀect of simply not updating at all.
28Table 2: Heterogeneity in Updating




































Each column is a separate regression. The outcome in all regressions is the log belief ratio. δ, βH,a n dβL are






L are the diﬀerential responses attributable to being male (j = Male) or high ability (j = Able).




probability instead of 75%. Subjects might underweight signals because they are used to en-
countering weaker ones in everyday life. We present two pieces of evidence that suggest that
simple cognitive errors are not the driving factor.
First, we show that conservatism and asymmetry do not correlate with the cognitive ability
of participants. Speciﬁcally, we assess whether biases are present both among high performers
(those that score in the top half) and low performers on the IQ quiz. Table 2a reports estimates
of Equation 19 diﬀerentiated by ability. Able participants do not have diﬀerent estimates either
on the weight put on the prior, or on the way they incorporate positive and negative signals.
There is no evidence that more able (higher performing) participants update in any diﬀerent
way than less able participants, which suggests that cognitive errors are not the main factor
that prevent subjects from being perfect Bayesians.
The second analysis that helps distinguish our model from a cognitive errors interpretation
is to examine the results of the follow-up experiment, in which a random subset of subjects
performed an updating task that was formally identical to the one in the original experiment,
but which dealt with the ability of a robot rather than their own ability. For these subjects
29Table 3: Belief Updating: Own vs. Robot Performance
Regressor I II III
βH 0.426 0.349 0.252
(0.087)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗∗
βL 0.330 0.241 0.161
(0.050)∗∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗
βRobot
H 0.362 0.227 0.058
(0.155)∗∗ (0.116)∗ (0.081)
βRobot
L 0.356 0.236 -0.006
(0.120)∗∗∗ (0.085)∗∗∗ (0.089)
P(βH + βRobot
H = 1) 0.128 0.000 0.000
P(βL + βRobot
L = 1) 0.004 0.000 0.000
P(βH = βL) 0.302 0.118 0.039
P(βH + βRobot
H = βL + βRobot
L ) 0.454 0.316 0.030
N 160 248 480
R2 0.567 0.434 0.114
Notes:
1. Each column is a separate regression. The outcome in all regressions is the change in the log belief





L are the diﬀerential response attributable to obtaining a signal about the
performance of a robot as opposed to about one’s own performance.
2. Estimation samples are restricted to subjects who participated in the follow-up experiment and observed
the same sequence of signals as in the main experiment. Column I includes only subjects who updated
at least once in the correct direction and never in the wrong direction in both experiments. Column II
adds subjects who never updated their beliefs. Column III includes all subjects.





30we pool the updating data from both experiments and estimate:
logit(ˆ μ
t,e
i ) − logit(ˆ μ
t−1,e
i )=βH · I(sit = H)λH + βL · I(sit = L)λL +
+βRobot
H · 1(e = Robot) · I(sit = H)λH + βRobot
L · 1(e = Robot) · I(sit = L)λL +  t
i (21)
Here, e indexes experiments (Ego or Robot), so that the interaction coeﬃcients βRobot
H and
βRobot
L tell us whether subjects process identical information diﬀerently across both treatments.
Note that as we cannot reject δ = 1 (Table 1), we impose that restriction and estimate via
OLS here for brevity. Table 3 reports results.
Result 4 Both conservatism and asymmetry are reduced, the former signiﬁcantly, when the
same subjects with the same initial priors observe the same ﬂow of information about a robot’s
performance rather than their own performance.
The baseline coeﬃcients βH and βL are similar to their estimated values for the larger sample
(see Table 1), suggesting that participation in the follow-up was not selective on updating
traits. The interaction coeﬃcients are both positive and signiﬁcant — they imply that subjects
are roughly twice as responsive to feedback when it concerns a robot’s performance as they
are when it concerns their own performance. In fact, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
βH + βRobot
H =1( p =0 .13), though we can still reject βL + βRobot
L =1( p =0 .004). While
conservatism does not entirely vanish, it is clearly much weaker. This provides support for
our model where conservatism is driven by anticipatory ego utility. Also consistent with this
view is the fact that subjects are less asymmetric in relative terms when they update about







. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that they update symmetrically about robot performance such that βH +βRobot
H = βL +βRobot
L
(p =0 .45).
The data show that conservatism and asymmetry are not correlated with ability and fur-
thermore are reduced when assessing the performance of a robot, rather than one’s own ability.
This suggests that subjects are biased Bayesians and not merely cognitively constrained belief
updaters.
5.5 Discussion
Before we turn to the analysis of the demand for information, we discuss how our results relate
to the existing literature on information processing and self-conﬁdence.
Memory & Persistence. Our theory of a “biased Bayesian” decision-maker follows the
mainstream approach to modeling belief evolution through Bayesian updating. A Bayesian
framework has the feature that information that is incorporated into beliefs is persistent.
31Other models have examined the implications of imperfect memory for learning (Mullainathan
2002, Benabou and Tirole 2002, Wilson 2003). Our results show that subjects’ priors are
essentially fully persistent once measurement error is accounted for. The time frame of the
experiment was short, however, and we do not rule out information decay over longer periods.
Attribution bias. A large literature in psychology has argued for the existence of self-
serving “attribution biases,” or tendencies to take credit for good outcomes and deny blame for
bad ones. These studies do not necessarily imply anything about updating, however, since at-
tributions are possible without revising one’s beliefs, and indeed without any uncertainty at all.
For example, in one prototypical experimental paradigm, subjects taught a student and then
attributed the student’s subsequent performance either to their teaching or to other factors.
The ﬁnding that subjects attribute poor performances to lack of student eﬀort, while taking
credit for good performances, is cited as evidence of attribution bias. Yet these attributions are
consistent with the ﬁxed beliefs that (a) student eﬀort and teacher ability are complementary
and (b) the teacher is capable, and these beliefs need not have changed at all to produce the
data. More generally, critics within psychology argue that studies of attribution bias “seem
readily interpreted in information-processing terms” (Miller and Ross 1975, p. 224), because
the data-generating processes were not clearly deﬁned (Wetzel 1982), or because key outcome
variables are not objectively deﬁned or elicited incentive-compatibly.26
In contrast to these studies, we (1) clearly deﬁne the probabilistic event (scoring in the top
half) and outcome variables (subjective beliefs about the probability of that event) of interest,
and (2) explicitly inform subjects about the conditional likelihood of observing diﬀerent signals.
The lack of ambiguity makes our test for asymmetry unconfounded and also stringent, since
it may well be precisely in the interpretation of ambiguous concepts that agents are most free
to be self-serving.
Overconﬁdence. Over time, asymmetric updating leads to overconﬁdence, in the sense
that individuals will over-estimate their probability of succeeding at a task compared to the
forecast of a perfect Bayesian who began with the same prior and observed the same stream
of signals. We emphasize this deﬁnition to contrast it with others frequently used in the
literature. Findings that more than x% of a population believe that they are in the top x%
in terms of some desirable trait are commonly taken as evidence of irrational overconﬁdence,
but Z´ abojn´ ık (2004), Van den Steen (2004), Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005), and Benoit and
Dubra (forthcoming) have all illustrated how such results can obtain under perfect Bayesian
26For example, Wolosin, Sherman and Till (1973) had subjects place 100 metal washers on three wooden dowels
according to the degree to which they felt that they, their partner, and the situation were “responsible” for the
outcome. Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) show that if agents disagree over the interpretation of concepts like
“responsibility,” this can generate positive self-image on average, and conclude that “there is a parsimonious way
to organize the ﬁndings that does not depend on assuming that individuals process information irrationally...”
(p. 1387).
32information processing. Our deﬁnition and result are not subject to these critiques.
Conservatism and Bayes’ rule. Psychologists have also tested Bayes’ rule as a positive
model of human information-processing in ego-neutral settings. A prototypical experiment in-
volves showing subjects two urns containing 50% and 75% red balls, respectively, then showing
them a sample of balls drawn from one of the two urns and asking them to predict which urn
was used. Unsurprisingly, these studies do not ﬁnd asymmetry (indeed it is unclear how one
would deﬁne it when ego is not at stake). Studies during the 1960s did ﬁnd conservatism, but
this view was upset by Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) discovery of the “base rate fallacy,”
seen as “the antithesis of conservativism” (Fischhoﬀ and Beyth-Marom 1983, 248–249). Re-
cently Massey and Wu (2005) have generated both conservative and anti-conservative updating
within a single experiment: their subjects underweight signals with high likelihood ratios, but
overweight signals with low likelihood ratios. In the light of this literature it is important that
we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more conservatism when subjects update about their own performance as
opposed to a robot’s performance, holding constant the data generating process. This supports
the interpretation that conservatism is a motivated and not merely a cognitive bias.
Conﬁrmatory bias. Asymmetry is not obviously more pronounced among subjects with a
more optimistic prior (see Figure 7). This is not consistent with at least simple interpretations
of conﬁrmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag 1999). However, our results do mechanically imply a
steady-state relationship similar to conﬁrmatory bias: more asymmetric individuals will tend
both to have higher beliefs and to respond more to positive information.
6 Demand for Information
The standard economic model of learning predicts that agents always place a weakly positive
value on information. This is because the best action to take after receiving information cannot
do worse on average than the action one would have taken without it. This need not hold in our
model, however (Proposition 5), because hard information tends to destroy the belief utility
built up through asymmetric updating.
We calculate subjects’ implied value for the various information packages. For example, a
subject’s valuation for coarse information on her performance — whether or not she was in
the top half — is deﬁned as her bid for $2 and learning whether she scored in the top half,
minus her bid for $2, all in cents. Taking this diﬀerence removes bias due to misunderstanding
the dominant strategy in the “bid for $2” decision problem.27 Similarly, a subject’s valuation
for publicity of that coarse information is her bid for receiving information both publicly and
privately minus her bid for receiving it privately.
27Among our subjects, 89% bid less than $2, and 80% bid less than $1.99.
33Table 4: Implied Valuations for Information: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. P(v<0)
Estimation Sample
Information (Coarse) 650 16.5 47.8 0.09
Information (Precise) 650 40.0 78.3 0.09
Publicity (Coarse) 651 -52.3 73.0 0.66
Publicity (Precise) 651 -71.1 88.0 0.71
Women
Information (Coarse) 338 16.4 49.8 0.11
Information (Precise) 338 38.7 82.0 0.11
Publicity (Coarse) 339 -57.4 74.3 0.72
Publicity (Precise) 339 -77.1 89.6 0.75
Men
Information (Coarse) 312 16.7 45.5 0.07
Information (Precise) 312 41.5 74.1 0.06
Publicity (Coarse) 312 -46.7 71.2 0.60
Publicity (Precise) 312 -64.5 85.7 0.65
Values for coarse information (learning whether you were in the top or bottom half) and precise information
(learning your exact percentile rank) are the diﬀerences between subjects’ bids for $2 and their bids for the
bundle of $2 and learning that information via email. Values for publicity are the diﬀerences between (i) bids
for obtaining feedback both publicly online and privately by email, and (ii) bids for obtaining feedback only
by email. Values are in cents. The ﬁnal column reports the fraction of observations with strictly negative
valuations. There are fewer than 656 observations because 6 (5) subjects did not provide valuations for private
(public) information.
Subjects’ mean value for coarse information is 16.5 (s.d. 47.8), with 9% of subjects reporting
a negative value. The second two rows summarize how these valuations change when the
information is delivered publicly on a web page that other participants can view in addition
to privately via email. The value of publicity for coarse information is -52.3 (s.d. 73.0) with
66% of subjects reporting negative values. Subjects could also receive precise information, their
precise quantile. The value for private precise information exceeded that of coarse information:
the mean value was 40.0 (s.d. 78.3) with 9% of subjects reporting a negative value. Once more
publicity was viewed as much less desirable, with a mean value of -71.1 (s.d. 88.0) and 71%
of subjects reporting a negative value. While mean valuations are positive and more precise
information is valued more on average, a substantial fraction place a strictly negative valuation
on coarse and precise information about their rank.28
Result 5 (Information Aversion) A substantial fraction of subjects are willing to pay to
28As an interesting contrast, Eliaz and Schotter (2010) document that subjects are willing to pay positive
amounts for information (unrelated to ego) even when it cannot improve their decision-making.
34avoid learning their type.
A potential concern about this result is that it could be an artefact attributable to noise in
subjects’ recorded valuations. The strongest piece of evidence that this is not the case is our
next result, which suggests that conﬁdence has a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect on negative valuations.
Another indicator of the information content of our measure is the high correlation (ρ =0 .77)
between having a negative valuation for coarse information and a negative valuation for precise
information. We show in Section A-1 of the supplementary appendix that under the structural
assumption that errors are independently normally distributed, one can build on this intuition
to obtain a formal test of the reporting error hypothesis and that the second moments of the
bid data reject this hypothesis.
Result 6 More conﬁdent subjects are causally less information-averse.
In addition to predicting information-aversion, Proposition 5 implies that it should be less
common among more conﬁdent agents. To test this implication we regress an indicator I(vi ≥
0) on subjects’ logit posterior belief after all four rounds of updating, which is when they
bid for information. Columns I–III of Table 5 show that, as predicted, subjects with higher
posterior beliefs are signiﬁcantly more likely to have (weakly) positive information values. The
point estimate is slightly larger and remains strongly signiﬁcant when we control for ability
(Column II) and gender and age (Column III). Of course, there could be some unobserved
factor orthogonal to these controls that explains the positive correlation. To address this issue
Columns IV and V report instrumental variables estimates. We use two instruments. First,
the average score of other subjects randomly assigned to the same quiz type remains a valid
instrument for beliefs, as in Section 5 above. In addition, once we control for whether or
not the subject scored in the top half, the number of positive signals she received during the
updating stage is also a valid instrument, because the signals were random conditional on
ability. Estimates using these instruments are similar to the OLS estimates, slightly larger,
and though less precise, they are still signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
7 Gender Diﬀerences
Gender diﬀerences related to self-conﬁdence have been shown in numerous studies in psychol-
ogy. Economists have just recently begun to investigate gender diﬀerences in beliefs about
relative ability.29 Consistent with prior work we ﬁnd that men are signiﬁcantly more conﬁdent
29Numerous psychology studies purport to show that men are more (over-)conﬁdent than women; see the
references in Barber and Odean (2001), who use gender as a proxy measure of overconﬁdence in studying
investment behavior. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that men are much more competitive than women
35Table 5: Conﬁdence and Positive Information Value
OLS IV
Regressor I II III IV V
logit(μ) 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.027 0.027
(0.007)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.016)∗ (0.017)∗
Top Half -0.033 -0.035 -0.038 -0.042





First-Stage F-Statistic - - - 118.48 113.19
N 609 609 609 609 609
R2 0.007 0.010 0.016 - -
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Estimation is via OLS in Columns I–III and by IV in Columns
IV–V using the instruments described in the text. The outcome variable in all regressions is an indicator equal
to 1 if the subject’s valuation for information was positive; the mean of this variable is 0.91. “Top Half” is an
indicator equal to one if the subject scored above the median on his/her quiz type; “YOG” is the subject’s year




than women. The mean diﬀerence in conﬁdence prior to taking the quiz was 6.7% (p<0.001).
Some of this could reﬂect diﬀerences in actual ability: men scored 7.9 on average while women
scored 6.9, and this diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (p<0.001). However, even when we re-
strict ourselves to variation within groups of subjects who took the same version of the quiz
and received the same score, we ﬁnd that men are 5.0% more conﬁdent on average and this
diﬀerence remains highly signiﬁcant (p<0.001).
In this paper, we can, however, do more than simply add an additional, albeit very clean,
piece of evidence to the widespread claim that women are less conﬁdent than men. We can
ask what is at the root of this ﬁnding. Do women and men simply diﬀer in their prior, or do
they process information diﬀerently, or have a diﬀerent demand for information? Furthermore,
we address to what extent the theory of self-conﬁdence maintenance can account for these
diﬀerences.
To address gender diﬀerences in information processing, Table 2b reports estimates of
Equation 20 diﬀerentiated by gender and estimated using both OLS and instrumental vari-
ables. Men are substantially less conservative than women, reacting signiﬁcantly more to both
and that part of this diﬀerence is attributable to diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence. They also speculate that gender
diﬀerences in feedback aversion may have further explanatory power.
36positive and negative feedback and 21% more to feedback on average (23% when estimated








βL are 0.05 and −0.10, respectively, and neither is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero (p =0 .64,0.74). We have seen that ability is not correlated with either asymmetry or
conservatism. Hence, gender diﬀerences do not reﬂect simple diﬀerences in ability. The evi-
dence thus suggests that women are the more ego-defensive gender; they do not merely have
diﬀerent priors, but seem to process information diﬀerently.
Turning to demand for feedback, men and women place similar average valuations on
information; the means reported in Table 4 are not statistically diﬀerent from each other.
Men, however, are signiﬁcantly less averse to feedback. They are 3.6 percentage points less
likely to place negative bids for coarse information, relative to a baseline of 11% for women
(p =0 .09). They are also 4.6 percentage points less likely to place negative bids for precise
information, relative to a baseline of 11% for women (p =0 .03). This also is consistent with
our theory of self-conﬁdence maintenance if women tend to place more weight on anticipatory
utility (are more likely to have α>0). Figure 8 plots mean information values by gender
Figure 8: Information Values by Beliefs and by Gender


















Plots, for male and female subjects separately and for quartiles of the posterior belief distribution, the mean
valuations for learning whether or not the subject scored in the top half of performers.
37and by quartile of the posterior belief distribution. The relationship between beliefs and
valuations is inverse-U shaped for men, as a standard model of information demand would
predict. For women, however, valuations decline somewhat from the ﬁrst to second quartile
and then increase dramatically from there to the fourth quartile. Conﬁdent women express
signiﬁcantly stronger demand for information than conﬁdent men. Interestingly, valuations
are particularly low for women with beliefs between 26% and 50% (though not between 0%
and 25%). This is consistent with the theory, which predicts that subjects will optimally place
negative valuations on information when their conﬁdence is low (see Figure 4b). Diﬀerences in
how men and women weigh anticipatory utility may then explain the sharp gender diﬀerences
in valuation curves.
In sum, there are substantial gender diﬀerences in both information processing and infor-
mation acquisition, and these are consistent with our theory of self-conﬁdence management if
women place more weight on anticipatory utility than men.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Recent theoretical work has argued that information may aﬀect welfare in more subtle ways
than are captured by the traditional paradigm, in which information is useful strictly to im-
prove the accuracy of decision-making. Motivated by this new literature, we build a model to
understand how a biased Bayesian who prefers to be conﬁdent will learn about her own ability.
Such an agent reacts less on average to new information than a perfect Bayesian, reacts more
to positive than to negative information, and is averse to obtaining highly informative feedback
when her conﬁdence is low.
Our experimental design allows us to measure beliefs in an incentive-compatible way and
to cleanly separate the role of priors and signals in shaping posterior beliefs. We ﬁnd that
both our predictions regarding updating are borne out in the data: subjects are on average
conservative and asymmetric updaters. A substantial fraction also exhibit an aversion to
information about their relative ability, and low conﬁdence signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood
of aversion. Overall, the data support the view that subjects carefully regulate their self-
conﬁdence to the potential detriment of subsequent decision-making.
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42AP r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that the agent’s logit-belief at time ˜ T in the high state converges to inﬁnity in
probability. Consider the lower bound m
˜ T = logit(μ)+
˜ T
2 [pλH +( 1− p)λL]. We use Hoeﬀd-
ing’s (1963) inequality to bound the probability that the agent’s logit-belief falls below the
lower bound m




˜ T) − γ
˜ T
H <m








4 (pλH +( 1− p)λL)
2













Moreover, if the logit-belief falls above the lower bound m
˜ T, then the posterior satisﬁes
μ
˜ T ≥ 1 − O(exp(−m
˜ T)). As the cost distribution has no atoms, the agent will take the action
with probability at least 1 − O(exp(−m
˜ T)) in this case. Hence, the overall perfect Bayesian’s
utility conditional on being a high type is (1−E(c))+O(exp(−a  ˜ T)) for some constant a  > 0.
Using an analogous argument, we can show that the perfect Bayesian’s utility conditional
on being a low type is O(exp(−a   ˜ T)) for some constant a   > 0. By combining both results,
we have proved the proposition.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2





  ˜ T
t=1
the following holds: ˆ μt >cimplies μt >c . Since the cost distribution is continuous and posi-
tive, this implies ˆ μt = μt for any signal history. It follows that ˆ μ0 = μ0, ˆ λT
H = λH and ˆ λT
L = λL
for T ≥ 2 as there are at least 3 signal histories at time T and only three parameters.
A.3 Auxiliary Lemma on Downward-Neutral Bias
The following lemma on the downward-neutral bias (DNB) deﬁned in equation 9 will be useful
for the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
Lemma 2 Assume a biased Bayesian with DNB. At any relative time τ>0, the agent’s high
state belief converges in probability to 1 while the agent’s low state belief converges in probability
to μ∗
L. The total utility of the agent converges to the utility of an unrestricted agent with belief
μ∗
L in the low state and belief 1 in the high state.
43Figure 3 illustrates the intuition for the lemma. In the high state, the agent’s logit-belief at
relative time τ is of order (τT) · T−θ because in each period the agent’s logit-belief moves up
by an expected pˆ λT
H +( 1− p)ˆ λT
L. This expression converges to inﬁnity. In the low state, the
agent’s logit-belief behaves like a driftless random walk whose standard deviation is of order
√
τTT−θ (as we sum τT conditionally independent observations), which converges to 0.
To formalize this arguments, we ﬁrst show that for any lower bound m the probability that
the high type’s logit-belief lies above m at relative time τ converges to 1 as T →∞ :
P(logit(ˆ μ τT ) <m |H)=P
 
logit(μ τT ) − ˆ γ
 τT 





We can simplify the right-hand side of the inequality:
m − ˆ γ
 τT 
H = m − logit(μ∗




= m − logit(μ∗




This expression converges to −∞ as θ<1a n dp−(1− p)
q
1−q > 0f o rp>q . We can therefore
use Hoeﬀding’s (1963) inequality:




















≤ exp(−2τT(1 − φ)(p(1 − q) − (1 − p)q)
2) (24)
The last inequality holds for some 0 <φ<1a n da n yτT1−θ >t .30 This implies, that the high
type’s logit-belief converges to +∞ in probability and hence the agent’s belief converges to 1
in probability. We can now easily show that the high type’s expected utility converges to the
expected utility of the unconstrained high type who always chooses belief 1: we can simply
choose ﬁrst m and then any small relative time interval [0,τ∗] so that the above probability
bound applies for suﬃciently high T. As the cost distribution is atomless, we can approximate
the high type’s unconstrained solution as closely as we want.
We next show that for any  >0 the probability that the low type’s belief stays within
an  -neighborhood around logit(μ∗
L) converges to 1 in probability as T →∞ . Note, that the
expected logit-belief at any relative time τ is logit(μ∗
L) under the downward-neutral bias. We
30Here, we exploit the fact that the diﬀerence in the numerator is dominated by the τT
1−θ term.
44can therefore use Hoeﬀding’s (1963) inequality again:
P(|logit(ˆ μ τT ) − logit(μ∗














=2 e x p
 











The claim follows, since 2θ − 1 > 0a n dτ ≤ 1. Since the cost distribution is atomless and the
probability bound holds for all relative times, it follows that the expected utility of the low
type agent converges to the utility of the unconstrained low type who always chooses belief
μ∗
L.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst show conservatism through proof by contradiction. The main argument for the proof is
as follows: assume the agent’s responsiveness does not converge to 0. There will be a sequence
of (Tj), such that ˆ λTj
H − ˆ λTj
L >δ>0f o rs o m eδ>0. We will show that the agent’s total
utility in the low state converges to 0 as Tj →∞ . Hence the biased Bayesian would not do
strictly better than a perfect Bayesian for large Tj. We then construct a downward-neutral
bias that strictly increases the total utility of the biased Bayesian for large enough T: hence,
the responsiveness of the optimally biased Bayesian has to converge to 0.
To formalize this argument we bound the agent’s utility in the low state and then show
that we can make this bound arbitrarily small. We ﬁrst choose a (small)  >0 and bound
the probability that the agent’s posterior belief ˆ μt at time t falls into the interval [ ,1 −  ]i n
the low state of the world. There are at most logit(1− )−logit( )
δ signal realizations St
H that
generate logit posteriors in the interval [logit( ),logit(1 − )] (note that St
L = t−St
H). We use













45Hence, we can deduce:
Prob( <ˆ μt < 1 −  ) ≤
















Now ﬁx η>0 and consider any relative time τ>η . Then we obtain:31





Note, that this upper bound does not depend on τ.
Having obtained this probability bound we can bound the agent’s utility in the low state:
U(ˆ μ0,  ˆ λ|α,μ0,  λ) ≤ ηα(1 − E(c))
      
During ﬁrst ηT periods
per-period utility is at
most 1 − E(c).




      
Utility bound if poste-
rior belief falls into the
interval [ ,1 −  ]a f t e r
relative time η
+( 1 − η)α (1 − E(c))
      
Utility bound if poste-
rior beliefs is below   af-
ter relative time η
+(1− η)
 
α(1 − E(c)) −




      
Utility bound if posterior be-
lief is above 1−  after relative
time η
(29)
Due to the long-term learning condition and the fact that the cost distribution is non-atomic,
the last term is negative for suﬃciently small  .N e x t ,c h o o s eη and   small enough to make the
ﬁrst and third term as small as desired. Finally, choose Tj large enough to make the second
term as small as desired. Therefore, the low type’s utility cannot be bounded away from 0 and
the biased Bayesian does not do strictly better than a perfect Bayesian for large Tj.
Now consider the function Lα(x) as deﬁned in equation 8. We show in the main text that
there is some x∗ > 0s u c ht h a tLα(x∗) > 0. Now consider a downward-neutral bias with initial
belief at μ0 = x∗. This bias will generate strictly positive total utility that is bounded away
from 0 for suﬃciently large T. This is a contradiction, as we have just shown that the total
utility of the optimally biased agent converges to 0.
We next establish asymmetry. We again use proof by contradiction. Assume that the agent
31We add 1 to be able to omit the term o(
1 √
t).
46is not asymmetric in the limit. Then there is a sequence (Tj) such that βTj
H ≤ βTj
L along this
sequence. Assume that the mean logit-belief ˆ γTj
H in the ﬁnal period Tj has no upper bound
M. In this case, we can take a further sub-sequence (Tj) such that ˆ γTj
H converges to +∞.B u t
this implies that ˆ γTj
L converges to −∞, as the agent is not asymmetric. But then the agent’s
utility converges to the perfect Bayesian’s utility. We just showed that the biased Bayesian can
do strictly better which is a contradiction. Next, assume that the mean logit-belief ˆ γTj
H in the
ﬁnal period Tj has an upper bound M. In this case, the biased Bayesian again does strictly
worse than under a DNB deﬁned where the agent’s belief converges to 1 in the high state of
the world and to a maximum of the function Lα(x) in the low state of the world. Hence, we
again get a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We show that any “non-DNB”-like bias is strictly dominated by a DNB bias. In order to bound
the loss from any non-DNB-like bias, it will be useful to deﬁne an upper envelope function








for some y ∈ [x,μ∗
L]. Note that L  
α is continuous and hence strictly negative in an  -neighborhood
of μ∗
L,s i n c eL  
α(μ∗
L) < 0. We can assume that L  
α(y) ≤− A for some A>0i nt h a tn e i g h b o r -








L −  )2 for x ≤ μ∗





L −   ≤ x ≤ μ∗




L +  )2 for x ≥ μ∗
L +  
(31)
This upper envelope will lie above Lα(x)i nt h e -neighborhood. We can reﬁne the upper
envelope function such that the upper envelope function dominates Lα(x) on the interval [0,1]







L −  ,μ∗
L +  ]
Denote the supremum of the Lα(M)w i t hm∗. Due to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
there is a sequence (xj) ⊂ M such that Lα(xj)c o n v e r g e st om∗. Due to continuity, there
is a subsequence (xj 
)o f( xj) such that xj 
→ ˜ x and Lα(xj 
) → m∗ and Lα(˜ x)=m∗.I f
m∗ ≥ Lα(μ∗
L) then we get a contradiction because we assumed that the maximum at μ∗
L is
unique. Hence, m∗ <L α(μ∗
L). Therefore, we can simply make the  -neighborhood of the
47upper-envelope function small enough such that it always lies above m∗. This will ensure that
the upper envelope function dominates Lα on the interval [0,1].32
Proof of part (c). We can now show that any non-DNB-like bias is dominated by a DNB-




T does not converge to 0. Then there is a subsequence (Tj)
and some δ>0s u c ht h a t( ˆ λTj
H − ˆ λTj
L )
√
Tj >δ . Given relative time τ, we deﬁne the random
variable X
τ,Tj




  τTj 





H − q τTj 
 τTj 
(32)
This random variable is the mean of a sum of  τTj  i.i.d binary random variables whose
expectation is zero and standard deviation equals
 





    
   
 
 τTj Xτ,Tj
   









We take z =
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 τTj 
H − q τTj 
 
    >
 
 τTj q(1 − q)
 
=1− 2Φ(−1)
Using some algebra we can show:
 
ˆ λTj





H − q τTj 
 












    >
 
 τTj q(1 − q)
 
ˆ λTj



















≥ 1 − 2Φ(−1)
This implies that with probability of at least 1−2Φ(−1) the logit-belief lies at least δ
 
τq(1 − q)
away from the mean logit-belief. If we ﬁx some τ∗, it is easy to see that the expected total
utility of the low-type agent using the upper-envelope function U(x) accumulated over time
32If there are ﬁnitely many local maxima, then the argument simpliﬁes to m
∗ being the second-highest
maximum.
48τ>τ ∗ is always strictly worse than the utility of the agent with a DNB who can maintain
beliefs arbitrarily closely to the optimal μ∗
L. Since her actual utility is even lower, we can
strictly improve the agent’s utility by using a DNB. Hence, our initial assumption led to a
contradiction and we can deduce that (ˆ λT




Proof of part (b). We next show that the ﬁnal mean logit-belief in the high state, γT
H
converges to inﬁnity as T →∞ . Otherwise, there would be a subsequence Tj a n da nu p p e r
bound M such that γTj
H <M. But together with the previous result that (ˆ λT




this would imply that the optimal Bayesian bias generates strictly less utility than the DNB.







L| would not converge to
1−q
q . Then there would be some  >0a n da
subsequence (Tj) such that
   








   
    >  . This implies ˆ λTj
L = −Bˆ λTj
H where
 




    >  .
We therefore obtain:
ˆ γT
L = logitˆ μ0 + T
 
qˆ λTj




This implies |ˆ γTj
L − logitˆ μ0| >T j(1 − q)  M
Tj =( 1− q) M. Using a similar argument as in
the proof of part (c) above, it follows that this strategy does strictly worse than following the
DNB.
Proof of part (a). Finally, assume that ˆ μ0 does not converge to μ∗
L. Then there is a
subsequence (Tj) where the initially chosen belief stays outside an   neighborhood of μ∗
L.
Combining this observation with (ˆ λT
H − ˆ λT
L)
√
T → 0 and the fact that the drift of the low
type’s logit-belief is close to zero due to part (b), it follows again that the DNB strictly
dominates this strategy.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1. Since the perfect Bayesian’s error proba-
bility converges to zero, she has no need for information in the limit.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5







p(1−p). W eh a v ea l s os h o w nt h a tˆ γT
L → μ∗
L and ˆ γT
H →∞and
that the variance of the low and high type’s belief at any relative time τ>0 converges to 0.
For this reason, the probability at relative time τ that the agent is a low type conditional on
ˆ μτ = x converges to 1. Hence learning one’s type decreases the agent’s total utility to 0 with
probability approaching 1 as T →∞and destroys belief utility Lα(1−τ)(x)( s i n c el o wt y p e
logit-beliefs follow a driftless random walk with vanishing variance).
49A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Each vector   ˆ λ implies a unique pair (ˆ p, ˆ q). Using algebra we obtain:
ˆ q =
1 − exp(ˆ λL)
exp(ˆ λH) − exp(ˆ λL)
(34)
Proposition 4 implies that ˆ λT
H, ˆ λT
H = o( 1 √
T ). Using the exponential approximation exp(x)=





























Using an analogous argument we can show:
ˆ pTˆ λT















This establishes that the mean logit-beliefs of both the high and low type are driftless random
walks from the perspective of the naive biased Bayesian. Hence, starting from an initial belief
x the naive biased Bayesian does not expect to learn anything in the limit about her type and
her willingness to pay for information converges to WTPS(x).
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A-1 A Test for Non-negative Information Valuations
If subjects are not careful recording their answers, there may be cases where they record a lower
value for $2 and information than for $2 alone, simply by chance. This section constructs a
formal test of this hypothesis under weak assumptions about the structure of reporting errors.
Let Si, Si + Ci,a n dSi + Pi be agent i’s true valuation of $2, $2 and coarse feedback, and $2
and precise feedback, respectively. Drop i subscripts for brevity. We assume that agents report
these quantities with additive errors that are distributed normally, identically, independent of
each other, and independent of true valuations, so that we observe
ˆ S = S +  S
ˆ C = S + C +  C
ˆ P = S + P +  P,
where  z ∼ N(0,σ2)f o rz ∈{ S,C,P}. The second moments of our data are
V (ˆ S)=V (S)+σ2
V ( ˆ C)=V (S)+V (C)+2 Cov(S,C)+σ2
V ( ˆ P)=V (S)+V (P)+2 Cov(S,P)+σ2
Cov(ˆ S, ˆ C)=V (S)+Cov(S,C)
Cov(ˆ S, ˆ P)=V (S)+Cov(S,P)
Cov( ˆ C, ˆ P)=V (S)+Cov(S,C)+Cov(S,P)+Cov(C,P).
1This system is not point-identiﬁed as there are 7 parameters and 6 equations. However, we can
bound the parameters by imposing the requirements that variances be positive and correlation
coeﬃcients within [−1,1]. To bound σ2,n o t et h a t
V (C)=V ( ˆ C)+V (ˆ S) − 2Cov(ˆ S, ˆ C) − 2σ2
V (P)=V ( ˆ P)+V (ˆ S) − 2Cov(ˆ S, ˆ P) − 2σ2
Cov(C,P)=Cov( ˆ C, ˆ P)+V (ˆ S) − Cov(ˆ S, ˆ C) − Cov(ˆ S, ˆ P) − σ2,















Cov( ˆ C, ˆ P)+V (ˆ S) − Cov(ˆ S, ˆ C) − Cov(ˆ S, ˆ P) − σ2
 
  
V ( ˆ C)+V (ˆ S) − 2Cov(ˆ S, ˆ C) − 2σ2
  
V ( ˆ P)+V (ˆ S) − 2Cov(ˆ S, ˆ P) − 2σ2
  ≤ 1
The largest value of σ that satisﬁes these restrictions for our data is σ   26.4.
Now ﬁx any x<0a n dl e tn(x) be the number of observations for which both ˆ Ci−ˆ Si <xand
ˆ Pi− ˆ Si <x . Under the null hypothesis that Ci and Pi are bounded below by 0, the probability
that these inequalities hold for any agent i is at most ζ(x,σ2) ≡ P( S ≥ max{ C,  P}−x), the
probability when Ci = Pi = 0. Note that this yields a very conservative test, since presumably
many subjects do value information. The bound can be calculated numerically for any given
x and σ2, and consequently the probability that ˆ Ci − ˆ Si <xand ˆ Pi − ˆ Si <xhold for n(x)o r








ζ(x,σ2)m(1 − ζ(x,σ2))N−m. (38)
We calculated p(x,σ2)f o rσ =2 6 .4 and for a variety of thresholds x. Figure A-1 plots the
results. For any threshold below −60 we can reject the null at the 0.01 level.
A-2 Additional Tables
2Figure A-1: Noise Tests





















Plots probabilities of observing n(x) reported information values less than x under the null hypothesis that all
true information values are 0, for various values of x.
Table A-1: Quiz Performance: Summary Statistics
Correct Incorrect Score
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Overall
Restricted Sample 656 10.2 4.3 2.7 2.1 7.4 4.8
Full Sample 1058 9.7 4.3 3.0 2.4 6.8 4.9
By Quiz Type
1 79 8.1 3.1 1.7 1.2 6.4 3.3
2 85 13.0 2.9 2.7 2.1 10.3 3.4
3 69 8.9 3.3 3.0 2.1 5.9 3.8
4 74 12.2 3.8 3.1 2.3 9.2 4.6
5 75 6.5 1.6 4.0 2.3 2.5 2.8
6 63 14.5 4.5 2.3 1.7 12.3 4.7
7 73 7.6 2.6 2.2 1.7 5.4 3.1
8 69 13.6 2.8 3.2 1.8 10.4 3.3
9 69 7.3 3.5 2.7 2.8 4.7 4.5
By Gender
Male 314 10.6 4.2 2.7 2.3 7.9 4.8
Female 342 9.7 4.4 2.8 2.0 6.9 4.8
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h
e
l
o
g
p
r
i
o
r
o
d
d
s
r
a
t
i
o
;
β
H
a
n
d
β
L
a
r
e
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
l
o
g
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
r
a
t
i
o
f
o
r
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
s
i
g
n
a
l
s
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
B
a
y
e
s
i
a
n
u
p
d
a
t
i
n
g
(
f
o
r
b
o
t
h
p
e
r
f
e
c
t
a
n
d
b
i
a
s
e
d
B
a
y
e
s
i
a
n
s
)
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
s
t
o
δ
=
β
H
=
β
L
=
1
.
2
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
a
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
w
h
o
s
e
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
w
e
r
e
a
l
w
a
y
s
w
i
t
h
i
n
(
0
,
1
)
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
1
-
5
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
t
o
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
w
h
o
u
p
d
a
t
e
d
t
h
e
i
r
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
i
n
e
v
e
r
y
r
o
u
n
d
a
n
d
n
e
v
e
r
i
n
t
h
e
w
r
o
n
g
d
i
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
;
C
o
l
u
m
n
6
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
i
s
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
1
-
4
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
u
p
d
a
t
i
n
g
i
n
e
a
c
h
r
o
u
n
d
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
l
y
,
w
h
i
l
e
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
5
-
6
p
o
o
l
t
h
e
4
r
o
u
n
d
s
o
f
u
p
d
a
t
i
n
g
.
3
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
v
i
a
O
L
S
i
n
P
a
n
e
l
A
a
n
d
v
i
a
I
V
i
n
P
a
n
e
l
B
,
u
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
c
o
r
e
o
f
o
t
h
e
r
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
w
h
o
t
o
o
k
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
(
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
)
q
u
i
z
v
a
r
i
e
t
y
a
s
a
n
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
l
o
g
p
r
i
o
r
o
d
d
s
r
a
t
i
o
.
4
.
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
r
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
;
t
h
o
s
e
i
n
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
t
w
o
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
a
r
e
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
.
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
i
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
d
a
s
:
∗
p
<
0
.
1
0
,
∗
∗
p
<
0
.
0
5
,
∗
∗
∗
p
<
0
.
0
1
.
4